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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Christopher Jay Kimsey appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for
post-conviction relief.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The district court set forth the relevant facts and proceedings in the underlying
criminal case as follows:
In case no. CRF-2008-1339, which underlies the current action,
petitioner pled guilty to the felony of aggravated assault in violation of
Idaho Code § 18-905. Petitioner appeared for sentencing on January 14,
2009 and sentence was imposed in open court. A Judgment and Sentence
was entered, filed, and sent to petitioner's attorney on that same date. The
court sentenced petitioner to two years fixed imprisonment, with four
years indeterminate, for a total of six years, with 362 days credit for time
served. The court reserved judgment for the filing of a memorandum of
restitution.
(R., pp.14-15.) Kimsey did not appeal from the judgment of conviction. (R., p.15.)
Kimsey filed his prose petition for post-conviction relief and supporting affidavit
on August 15, 2011 (R., pp.1-7), raising the following three claims: (1) "Convicts and
insanity acquitees"; (2) "Errors or irregularities and prejudice"; and (3) "Representation
by counsel" (R., p.2).

The district court filed its Notice of Intention to Dismiss,

explaining that Kimsey's petition was untimely under LC. § 19-4902 and, alternatively,
"based upon the pleadings filed by petitioner, there is no genuine issue of material fact
that would entitle him to relief if resolved in his favor." (R., pp.14-18.) In responding to
the court's Notice of Intention to Dismiss, Kimsey filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment
(R., pp.24-34) not only conceding his petition was untimely (R., p.31), but
acknowledging he was "acting pro se and will continue to do so" (R., p.29)
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(capitalization modified). After construing Kimsey's pleading as a response to its Notice
of Intention (R., p.35), the district court dismissed his post-conviction petition because it
was untimely and he had not established any basis for equitable tolling (R., pp.35-37).
Judgment was filed November 11, 2011 (R., pp.38-39), and Kimsey's Notice of Appeal
was timely filed on November 17, 2011 (R., pp.43-46).
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ISSUE

Kimsey's brief does not contain a statement of issues on appeal as required by
I.A.R. 35(a)(4). The state phrases the issue as follows:

The district court dismissed Kimsey's post-conviction petition because it was
untimely. Because he has failed to challenge the basis for the district court's decision,
must the decision of the district court be affirmed?
Alternatively,
Did the district court correctly determine Kimsey's post-conviction petition was
untimely and that he failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish equitable tolling?
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ARGUMENT

I.
The District Court's Order Must Be Affirmed Because Kimsey Has Not Challenged The
Court's Determination That The Petition Was Untimely
When the basis for the district court's ruling is not challenged on appeal, the
appellate court will affirm on the unchallenged basis. State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364,
366, 956 P.2d 1311 (Ct. App. 1998). Kimsey has made absolutely no effort to challenge
the district court's conclusion that his post-conviction petition was untimely or that he
had failed to establish any basis for equitable tolling.
Presumably, Kimsey has not challenged the district court's ruling because he
conceded the petition was untimely before the district court. In his Motion to Vacate
Judgment, Kimsey asserted his habeas corpus 1 should be reviewed "on the grounds of
improper exhaustion, due to the fact that I missed the filing deadlines established under
guidelines for appeals in the state courts ... and for the notice of appeal/post conviction."
(R., p.31) (capitalization altered). Kimsey further conceded, "You may ask why I have
waited this long to file for post-conviction relief, and the answer is that it was not
available until last year, which, by definition of the court's guidelines, is to [sic] late to
file."

(R., p.31) (capitalization altered)

Finally, in expressly addressing the district

court's Notice oflntention to Dismiss, Kimsey averred, "The fact is I am already to [sic]
late by the standards set for state courts." (R, p.32) (capitalization altered).
Because Kimsey has not challenged the district court's underlying basis for
dismissing his post-conviction petition, the court's decision must be affirmed.

1 Although not part of the underlying record, Kimsey has also filed a federal Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus that remains pending before the federal district court.
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II.
Kimsey Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred By Dismissing Kimsey's
Petition Because It Was Untimely
A.

Introduction
Even if this Court does not affirm solely on the basis that Kimsey has failed to

challenge the only basis for the district court's dismissal of his post-conviction petition,
the order of summary dismissal must nevertheless be affirmed because he has failed to
establish his petition was timely or that he was entitled to equitable tolling.

B.

Standard Of Review
The applicability of a statute of limitation is a question of law subject to free

review on appeal. State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 245, 796 P.2d 121 (1990); State v.
Ochieng, 147 Idaho 621, 624, 213 P.3d 406 (Ct. App. 2009) ("[R]eview of the district
court's construction and application of the limitation statute is a matter of free review.").

C.

The District Court Correctly Determined Kimsey's Petition Was Untimely
Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) permits the filing of a post-conviction petition "any time

within one ( 1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination
of an appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is
later." Absent a showing by the petitioner that the limitation period should be tolled, the
failure to file a timely petition for post-conviction relief is a basis for summary dismissal
of the petition. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066 (2009); Evensiosky
v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 190-91, 30 P.3d 967 (2001); Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 959,
88 P.3d 776 (Ct. App. 2003).

Because Kimsey did not file a notice of appeal, the
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judgment became final on February 25, 2009, forty-two days after the district court
entered its Judgment and Sentence on January 14, 2009. See I.A.R. 14.
Therefore, for Kimsey's post-conviction petition to be timely, it had to be filed no
later than February 25, 2010, one year after the expiration of his time to appeal the
judgment. I.C. § 19-4902(a). However, Kimsey did not file his pro se petition until
August 15, 2011, nearly eighteen months after the expiration of the limitation period
under I.C. § 19-4902(a).

Moreover, as detailed above, Kimsey repeatedly conceded

before the district court that his petition was untimely. (R., pp.31-32.)
Because Kimsey's post-conviction petition was untimely, it was properly
dismissed by the district court.

D.

The District Court Correctly Determined Kimsey Failed To Establish Any Basis
For Equitable Tolling
As explained in Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 386, 256 P.3d 791 (Ct. App.

2011) (citing Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 251, 220 P.3d 1066 (2009)), Idaho has
recognized equitable tolling in very limited situations, including, "where the petitioner
was incarcerated in an out-of-state facility without legal representation or access to Idaho
legal materials and where mental disease and/or psychotropic medication prevented the
petitioner from timely pursuing challenges to the conviction." Tolling is also permitted
where there are "'claims which simply are not known to the defendant within the time
limit, yet raise important due process issues."' Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250 (quoting
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870 (2007)). However, equitable
tolling involves a "stringent standard," and"[t]olling is not allowed for a petitioner's own
inaction." Schultz, 151 Idaho at 386. Finally, it is the "burden of the party asserting
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equitable tolling to show that such tolling is warranted and to submit evidence tending to
show that his claim was valid." Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 49, 232 P.3d 813 (2010)
(Kidwell, J. Pro Tern, concurring) (citing Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905); Rhoades, 148
Idaho at 249 (explaining one of the issues was "whether Rhoades has met his burden of
pleading facts that would entitle him to that equitable tolling").
In his Motion to Vacate Judgment, Kimsey contended, "Opportunity to meet the
requirements of equitable tolling 'doctrine' were [sic] impossible due to bias of counsel
and emphasis by medical/mental health to medicate rather than examine the legal aspects
for their legitimacy." (R., p.25) (capitalization altered). The district court recognized
Kimsey "fail[ed] to explain the nature of the bias or how the bias caused the delay in
filing the petition."

(R., p.36.) The court's conclusion is correct because Kimsey's

conclusory statement was unsupported by any facts or admissible evidence. Moreover, to
the extent Kimsey was contending ineffective assistance of counsel provided a basis for
equitable tolling, ineffective assistance of counsel has not been recognized as a viable
bias to equitably toll the statute of limitation. Stuart, 149 Idaho at 48 ("this Court [has]
suggested that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel would not qualify for equitable
tolling under the UPCPA").
Liberally reviewing Kimsey's pro se Motion to Vacate Judgment, the district
court also examined instances where he noted medical and mental health issues. (R.,
p.36.) However, the court properly recognized Kimsey never contended "any medication
or instability left him incompetent and prevented him from earlier pursuing challenges to
his conviction." (R., p.36.) This is particularly true because Kimsey's references to
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medical and mental health issues were also conclusory and unsupported by any
admissible evidence.
Because Kimsey's post-conviction petition is untimely and he has failed to meet
his burden of establishing any basis for equitable tolling, the district court's order
summarily dismissing his untimely post-conviction petition must be affirmed.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's Order
Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
DATED this 18 th day of January, 2013.

L. LaMONT ANDERSON
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on or about the 18th day of January, 2013, I caused to
be serviced a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated
below, postage prepaid where applicable, and addressed to the following:

X

Christopher Jay Kimsey, #91057
IMSI
P.O. Box 51
Boise, ID 83707

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
-Overnight Mail
-Facsimile
-Electronic Court Filing
--

L ~
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit
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